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Is A Compulsory Adjudication of
International Legal Disputes Possible?
Wienczyslaw J. Wagner*
General Observations
A FTER the withdrawal of the Church from any direct influence
on secular affairs, and the decline of the power of the German
Empire, a type of State, in principle completely independent of
any outer factors, was born. Lawyers, philosophers and statesmen
created, from the 16th century on, the theory of omnipotence of
the power of the State. Bodinus was one of its first and most
famous promoters in the internal life of the State,' and Vattel, two
centuries later, its chief theorist in the field of international rela-
tions.2 The notion of State-sovereignty, or of the fullest inde-
pendent power, was the source of theories which sanctioned the
anarchy in international life. One of its most important implica-
tions was that every State was permitted to be a judge in its own
causes. The ideas of Grotius about the belum justum and bellum
injustum3 were discarded, and the States were considered entitled
to decide, without any restrictions, in which manner they were to
defend their interests, including the possibility of having recourse
to war. No outer factors, States or organizations of nations, could
impose on a State their will or decision.
In the last fifty years, an evolution of ideas is observable in the
field of the development of international relations as well as in the
domain of theoretical considerations. One of the most important
results of the new trend is the creation of the illegal war concept,
developed under the League of Nations and various other interna-
tional arrangements, adhered to by a larger or smaller number of
States (or remaining only in a projected state), such as different
pacts of non-aggression, the Pact Briand-Kellogg, the Declaration
on the Definition of the Aggressor, etc. This was the concept that
served as a jurisdictional prerequisite in the prosecution and con-
viction of the authors of the last World War (with all the imper-
fections of the Nuremberg Tribunal).
The Charter of the United Nations made some further steps
towards the elimination of war as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes. The extension of its principles to States which are
not members of the United Nations4 is of revolutionary character.
* Teaching fellow, Northwestern University Law School.
1. BODIN, DE REPUBLICA (1576).
2. VATrEL, DROIT DES GENS (1758).
3. DE GRooT, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).
4. Art. 2 6 of the U.N. Charter: "The Organization shall ensure that States
which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Prin-
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However, it is not sufficient to forbid States to have recourse to
war. The necessary corollary of such prohibition must be the assur-
ance that every State can get justice by peaceful proceedings.
Not all disputes may be adjudicated by a judicial body. Some of
them cannot be settled by a mere application of law; they have a
"political" character, and they should be dealt with by a political
organ. Only if their character is "legal" are they suitable for a
court's decision.
Most cases involve both political and legal elements. If both par-
ties rely, in their assertions, on international law, the dispute
is clearly a legal or justiciable one. If one of them challenges some
rule of law as unjust and seeks to protect its interests which find
no support in the positive legal system, the dispute has a purely
political character. Thus, in most cases, the classification of a dis-
pute will depend on the qualification given it by the parties. In
many cases, however, it will be difficult to characterize the dispute.
The reason for the great number of political disputes is the fact
that the international community has no proper legislative power
at its disposal, 5 and can bring about peaceful changes in the exist-
ing status quo only in rare instances. An analogy, though distant,
may be drawn between the international legal order and domestic
ones which are vested with legislative powers but still present oc-
casions for "political" disputes-disputes which should be settled
by political rather than judicial bodies. In municipal, as in interna-
tional law, the problem of deternining in what category a dispute
should be classified may present much difficulty.6 The discussion of
these problems is beyond the scope of the present article which will
deal only with the settlement of legal disputes.
A theory has been advanced by some scholars that thousands of
years ago, relations between men were based exclusively on force.
7
In the state of "bellum omnium contra omnes," a man who saw that
his neighbor succeeded in killing a deer or was in possession of any
other thing which he envied, could take a club, beat him on the
head, and take what he coveted for himself. If we believe in this
theory, we must admit that until very recently, the relations between
ciples so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security."
5. This fact has been used as an argument against compulsory jurisdiction of
international courts; see Lauterpacht, The Absence of an International Legislature
and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, 11 BRiT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 134 (1930). However, the author reaches the conclusion that in many cases
the "amending process is actually and necessarily performed by international judges
in the ordinary exercise of their judicial function." Id at 155.
6. For an example, see e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), where the
Court was equally divided on the question whether the problem of whether the
Lieutenant Governor of Kansas was or was not a part of the "Legislature" of the
State presented a justiciable or a political question.
7. See, e.g., the writings of Gumplowicz.
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States were pretty similar to those between the human beings at
their primitive stage of development. Gradually, groups of indi-
viduals came to be created, based, in most cases, on kinship and
imposed control on the conduct of their members. For centuries,
the legal systems of the States have prevented individuals from
being judges in their own causes and from administering justice
for themselves. But at the same time, the legal system of a State
offers to all persons under its jurisdiction the possibility of having
their rights adjudicated by tribunals and of the execution of the
judicial decisions. The fundamental basis of every municipal legal
system is that the-adjudication of a case by a competent court is not
dependent upon the consent of the defendant. 9
The situation is still very different in the field of international
controversies. It is interesting to consider the question how far the
necessity of compulsory adjudication of international disputes
has, up to now, been recognized in the life of nations and what are
the prospects for the future.
Types of International Disputes
As mentioned above, disputes between States are not always
legal in nature. Some of them have a political character and are
not cognizable by purely judicial or quasi-judicial international
bodies. But disputes between States are not the only category of
litigation which exceed the borders of one country or which involve
nationals of more than one State. The only subjects of the tradi-
tional international law are groups of persons, usually organized
into States, but sometimes not possessing the full characteristics
of a State, like Dominions, or possessing the nationality of different
States, like the Catholic Church. Associations of States, like the
League of Nations or the United Nations, are clearly also subjects
of international law. But individuals, as such, are still not recog-
nized by positive international law as subjects of the law of nations,
in spite of the fact that outstanding scholars in international law,
such as Professor Philip C. Jessup in the United States o and Pro-
fessor Georges Scelle in France 1 advance radical changes in the
"classical" system of the law of nations. Thus, as a rule, indi-
8. See MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, 64 (7th ed. 1897).
9. Of course, any analogy between relations among individuals and among
States must be drawn very carefully: LissrrzYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 106 ss (1951). See also Borchard, The Place of Law and Courts it Inter-
national Relations, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 46, 48 (1943); "Much Harm has been done
... by those who would endow international law with the machinery of municipal
law." It may help, however, to realize the anarchy existing in international
relations.
10. JESSUP, THE MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1949).
11. SCmtL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIME DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944)
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viduals have no standing before international judicial bodies, and
their claims are presented by their governments, the case proceed-
ing on the fiction that the State itself has suffered the legal wrong.
If, however, a government does not wish, for any reason, to main-
tain the suit, the individual has no possibility of recourse to any
international means of settlement.
In the internal system of the United States, the federal courts
are not only used for litigation between States, but by virtue of
their diversity jurisdiction, federal courts may adjudicate claims
between the residents or nationals of different States, with excep-
tions provided by the law. The reason for the creation of federal
diversity jurisdiction is the possibility of bias which may exist in
the courts of a State against the citizens of another.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that such bias is much more likely
to occur in international life, against nationals of a foreign country.
Nevertheless, individuals of different nationality may sue each
other only before a State court which performs, in such a case,
the functions of an international court, according to Professor
Scelle's theory of "functional double. '" 12
Some exceptions have been made. Thus, as an incident to certain
capitulations, special international "mixed" tribunals were estab-
lished in Egypt in 1876.13 Their system was well developed and
consisted of courts of first instance and courts of appeals; the
judges were Egyptians and foreigners. The courts had jurisdiction
over cases involving interests of Egyptian and foreign nationals.
Other mixed tribunals or commissions have sometimes been cre-
ated to adjudicate disputes between individuals, nationals of dif-
ferent States. They are usually established at the end of hostilities
in order to adjust situations between nationals of the belligerent
countries. Such tribunals were called into being by the Peace
Treaties after World War I. Their powers were considerable and
their jurisdiction compulsory. In some cases, they could review
decrbes of the State courts and they were empowered to base their
decisions on equitable grounds.
Another type international dispute is that between an indi-
vidual and a foreign State. According to positive international law,
the individual cannot sue a State before an international tribunal,
and in order to bring a suit against a foreign government in a
court of the plaintiff's nationality, the consent of the prospective
defendant is necessary.' 4
12. Id. at 525.
13. For details, see HEYLIGERS, L'ORGANISATION DEs TRBUNAUX MIXTEs
D'EGYPTE, RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE,
Tome 17 (1927 II).
14. Exceptions to this rule are based on the implied consent of the State, e.g.
[Vol. 47
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Still another distinction may be drawn between international
disputes. Some of them reach international methods of settlement
without having been dealt with by the municipal courts of any
State. Others, involving suits to which individuals are parties, are
decided by the State courts, and a party to the dispute seeks pro-
tection of its rights, allegedly infringed and not recognized by those
courts, before a competent international body. Such situations
involve the power of review of domestic judgments by international
judicial proceedings.
Pre-judicial Methods of Settlement of International Disputes
Of course, settlement of international disputes can be effected
by resort to methods other than war or international litigation. As
a matter of fact, judicial proceedings stricto sensu are quite new
in international life. As Professor Brierly observed, one of the
methods of dispute adjustment between individuals, as well as
States, is to induce them to agree on some terms of settlement, tak-
ing advantage of the friendly help of third parties. 15 This was the
traditional way of dealing with international disputes, if the par-
ties did not deem it proper or wise to wage a war.
If a disagreement arose between the parties, usually they tried
first to settle the matter by direct negotiations. If no successful
result could be achieved, third parties could act. By offering their
good offices, they attempted to persuade the litigants that they
should not be discouraged, that the matter could be settled and that
they should reopen the negotiations. By exerting pressure on both
parties or on the party which took the more intransigent position,
renewed parleys-and possibly more successful ones-could be
brought about.
By mediation, a third party or parties assumed a more active
role. They participated in the negotiations and tried to reconcile
the litigants. The traditional rules of good offices, mediation and
other pre-judicial means of settlement of international disputes
have been codified 18 in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International DisputesiT at The Hague, in 1899 and 1907.'.
The Convention also provided for the creation of special Com-
missions of Inquiry with the purpose of finding the facts giving rise
in actions involving real estates. Of course, other exceptions may be created by
international agreements; see, e.g. the jurisdiction of the Central American Court
of Justice, infra. Mixed commissions may deal also with such claims, but in most
cases, only if the party's action is maintained by the respective government.
15. BarmuRy, THaE LAw oF NATIoNs 250 (1949).
16. However, this "codification" drew no borderline between mediation and con-
ciliation.
17. For Good Offices and Mediation, see Part II (Articles 2-8).
18. 36 STAT. 2199.
1952]
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to the dispute.'9 In cases where international tension arose out
of a different view in respect to some factual situation, this pro-
cedure gave satisfactory results.2 0
In all the aforementioned proceedings, the litigants themselves
are supposed to reach the terms of settlement of the dispute. If a
third party or some special body endeavors to suggest the terms,
without any obligation on the part of the litigants to accept these
suggestions, they make recourse to the procedure of conciliation.
This way of dealing with international disputes has been resorted
to, not only after litigation arises, but, per the terms of many multi-
lateral agreements made in the last 50 years, even before a dis-
pute actually arises. The system of conciliation has tended, in some
cases, to have a quasi-permanent character, and is characterized by
recourse to international lawyers, as contrasted with mediation,
where, for the most part, statesmen and politicians are resorted to.
Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, authorizing
the Council to "endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute,"
and if the attempt fails, to make recommendations to the parties
in dispute, established a kind of conciliation which guaranteed
the League's backing to the litigant who complied with a unani-
mous recommendation of the Council.
Under the U. N. Charter, similar powers of recommendation have
been granted to the Security Council. The Security Council's
powers, like those of the Council of the League, relate particularly
to disputes which may endanger international peace. According
to Article 33 of the Charter, the parties to such a dispute may be
called upon by the Council to settle their dispute by peaceful means.
Irrespective of the steps taken by the parties, the Council may,
"at any stage of a dispute ... recommend appropriate procedures
or methods of adjustment" (Article 36).21 If the parties fail in
their attempts, the Council may "recommend such terms of settle-
ment as it may consider appropriate" (Article 37).
The Council's powers of conciliation are not limited to the dis-
putes which are dangerous to international peace. It may also
make recommendations to the parties to any dispute, on the con-
dition, however, that all the parties so request (Article 38).
If the Council faces a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression," its powers exceed those of making recommenda-
19. Part III (Articles 9-25).
20. E.g. in the Hull (Dogger Bank) incident of 1904, where some Russian Navy
ships fired at English fishing boats on the North Sea, taking them for Japanese
vessels.
21. This provision has been criticized for giving the possibility to favor political
means of settlement of disputes in preference to judicial ones. See Delbez,
Levolution des Idees en Matiere de Reglement Pacifique des Conflits, 55 Rxv. GEN.
Da. INT. Pua. 5, 9 (1951).
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tions in that it can take decisions in order to "maintain or restore
international peace and security" (Article 39).
All the aforementioned means of settling disputes cannot strictly
be considered judicial since they don't lead to a judgment or de-
cision possessing a binding character for both parties and issued
by a body having the features of a court.
A very old expedient, endowed with judicial character, is arbi-
tration.22 However, it may be considered only as a quasi-judicial
proceeding, as the arbitrary tribunal is convened ad hoc in order
to deal with some particular dispute submitted to it by the agree-
ment of the litigants (compromis). It lasts only long enough to
make an award. The arbitrators, as a rule, are chosen by the
parties to the dispute, and, frequently, they select an umpire. As
do judges, the arbitrators are supposed to base their decisions on
the principles of international law, although they have often in-
voked justice rather than legal considerations.2 3 The most im-
portant differences between an arbitral and a judicial tribunal re-
late to their temporary or permanent character and the system of
appointment of judges; but for a long period of time, the border-
line was not clearly drawn,24 and a proposal, advanced at The
Hague, suggesting the creation of a body possessing the character-
istics of an international court, called it the Court of Arbitral
Justice. 5
The difficulties in reaching an agreement establishing the arbitral
tribunal are often very serious. The selection of the judges and
the scope of their award are the most disputed issues. The Hague
Convention, in its Part IV, Chapter II, endeavored to overcome
those difficulties by providing for an "obligatory compromis" where
these two problems might be settled by third parties (Articles 45,
55).
In past centuries, the arbitral procedure was resorted to only
by special agreements concluded, each time, after a dispute arose.
In the last decades, however, many treaties provided for submis-
sion to arbitration disputes which might arise between the con-
tracting parties in the future; thus, a kind of an "obligatory arbi-
tration" was created. One of the first treaties so providing was the
Franco-British Treaty of Arbitration of 1903.26 By its terms, the
parties agreed to submit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration of
22. The Hague Convention, pt. IV, c. I (Arts. 27-40).
23. BRIEmLY, op. cit. mepra note 15 at 252.
24. For the difficulties in distinguishing the judicial and arbitral procedures,
see Garner-Coignet, Procedure Judiciare et Procedure Arbitrale, 6 REv. DR. INT.
123 (1930).
25. See infra.
26. 32 Nouvn-u RECUEIL DES TnArrus (Martens-Stoerk) 479 (2nd series).
19521
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The Hague27 their "differences of a legal nature or relating to the
interpretation of treaties" if they did not affect "the vital inter-
ests, the independence, or the honour of the two states," and did
not concern "the interests of third parties." Similar provisions
have been accepted by subsequent treaties.
The possibility of treating most disputes as involving "the vital
interests" of a party practically annihilated the obligation to resort
to arbitration. Besides, in every case of a dispute, a special agree-
ment was to be entered into, defining the details of the arbitration.
Treaties which submit, a priori, all the future disputes of the
contracting parties to arbitration may be called General Obligatory
Arbitration Treaties.28 Irrespective of such treaties, a number of
obligatory arbitration agreements relating to some particular mat-
ters (commercial, navigation, etc.) have been concluded.
The concept of obligatory arbitration, with all its imperfections,
constitutes progress in the field of settlement of international dis-
putes. At The Hague Peace Conference, a multilateral compulsory
arbitration convention was suggested in respect to specified mat-
ters, but all efforts along these lines failed because of the oppo-
sition of certain large powers. In the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, however, it was emphasized
that the contracting parties recognize compulsory arbitration as
an adequate means for dealing with international disputes, and
expressed, in Article 40, the intention to extend "compulsory arbi-
tration to all cases which they may consider it possible to submit
to it."
First Efforts to Create an International Court
The first serious proposal to establish an international court was
advanced during the sessions of the Second Peace Conference in
The Hague in 1907. The idea's promoter was the United States,
and its suggestions met with understanding and support of certain
other powers; among them, France and Great Britain. The court,
of a permanent character, was to have jurisdiction in disputes be-
tween the States parties to the Convention establishing the court.
In case of a deadlock in reaching an agreement settling the terms
of submission of a particular dispute to the court, special pro-
27. The name of the Court is misleading. The Court is not permanent; there
is only a permanent panel of arbitrators at the disposal of the litigants. The Court
has been established by The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes.
28. Prof. M. 0. Hudson draws a distinction between the notions of "obligatory"
and "compulsory"; an "obligatory arbitration" agreement requires a further agree-
ment, after a dispute arises, on the "compromise," and thus is actually a promise to
agree; a "compulsory jurisdiction" may exist only where the party to a suit may
bring unilaterally its case directly before an established court HUDSON, INTERNA-
IONAL TRMUNALS 75 (1944).
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cedures were envisaged according to which, the court itself was
enabled to work out the compromis. The judges of the court were
to be long-term appointees, selected on the basis of international
law expertise.
The delicate problem of appointment of the judges destroyed
the whole idea. The small powers, moved by an exaggerated senti-
ment of the "equality" of States, insisted upon having a compe-
tence equal to that of the great powers in the appointment of
judges. Different suggestions were advanced in order to find a
solution acceptable by all States, but no agreement could be reached.
Another project, involving the establishment of an International
Prize Court, also came closer to fruition. The need for an inter-
national body adjudicating claims relating to prizes was felt for a
long time,2 9 since it had been observed that, in many instances,
the admiralty courts of different States did not exercise their func-
tions in a purely objective way. The project, submitted by Great
Britain and Germany, won general approval. It was revolutionary,
as it recognized three principles which would make the proposed
tribunal a true international judicial body similar to those of
municipal legal systems; 1) its jurisdiction was to be compulsory;
2) it was to be open not only to the governments, but also to indi-
viduals; and 3) it was to have power of review of the judgments
rendered by municipal tribunals. 30
An agreement on the problem of appointment of judges was
reached. The idea of a complete equality between the States was
abandoned, and it was agreed that the eight maritime powers
would have the privilege of appointing one judge each to sit for a
period of six years. The remaining seven judges were to be ap-
pointed by other States and were to sit for shorter periods, ranging
from two to four years. A provision was enacted, later incorporated
in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
which established the possibility of appointing judges ad hoc by
States, parties to a dispute, having no judges of their nationality
on the Court.
This daring project was adopted by the Conference and consti-
tuted the Twelfth The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907. Un-
fortunately, it was agreed that the Convention would be ratified
only after the codification of the rules of sea warfare. Another
conference was later convened in London and resulted, after min-
29. SC-LLE, op. cit. supra note 11 at 555.
30. In order to meet the United States' objection that constitutional difficulty
would arise in permitting appeals from the Supreme Court, it was agreed that where
such difficulty exists, no appeals, but original questions will be submitted to the
international court. See Finch, Appellate Jurisdiction in International Cases, 43 AM.
J. INT'L L. 88, 89-90 (1949); HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL TRmUNALS 82-3 (1944).
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ute discussion, in the promulgation of the London Declaration of
February 26, 1909, settling the most important problems in this
branch of law. The touchiest issue was the question of food contra-
band-a very delicate matter for Great Britain. The provisions
of the Declaration, dealing with this problem, seemed, to Parlia-
ment, dangerous to British interests, and the ratification there was
denied. This blow, struck by the foremost maritime power of
Europe, proved to be fatal, and neither the Declaration nor the
Projected Court ever came into effect.
The only international court which came into being before the
first World War was the Central American Court of Justice, pro-
moted by the United States and limited in its jurisdiction to five
Central American States. It was created by the Treaty of Decem-
ber 20, 1907, signed by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nica-
ragua and Salvador.
Among five small countries, it was a relatively easy matter to
agree on the question of appointment of judges, and each country
appointed one of the five judges of the Court. Its jurisdiction was
compulsory for disputes arising between the signatory States and
could be extended to those with third States if they were willing
to submit to it. It could render judgments in default of a party. The
Court was open to individuals as well as States31 and a provision
of the Treaty constituting the Court further empowered it to ad-
judicate disputes created by differences of opinion of public organs
of the signatory States. This gave to the Court, in some cases, the
competence of a Supreme Court of the signatory States. It was
hoped that by this device, internal security and balance of power
in the five States could be maintained under international super-
vision. The Court was established for a period of ten years.
The Court successfully dealt with some difficult cases in the first
years of its existence, but, unfortunately, lacking any possibility of
enforcing its judgments, it could not force Nicaragua to comply
with its decree involving the validity of treaties between Nicaragua
and the United States. Nicaragua's non-compliance was one of the
main reasons for the termination of the Court's existence after the
ten years elapsed.
The International Court in the Systems of the League
of Nations and the United Nations
Provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, the Permanent Court of International Justice--the first
31. The court could adjudicate also some types of cases brought by individuals
against any other contracting States; from the five cases brought in reliance on
this provision, four were held to be inadmissible, and the fifth was dismissed;
HUDSON', INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 68 (1944).
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really international court-was established in 1920. The difficult
question of appointment of judges was resolved by providing for
a double election of judges by the Council and the General Assembly
of the League of Nations, from among the foremost legal scholars
of the world. Each of the fifteen judges was to be a national of a
different State and the composition of the Court could be supple-
mented by judges ad hoc. Slight amendments to the Court's Statute
were made in 1929. The International Court of Justice, set up by
the United Nations, is but a continuation of the Permanent Court,
and its Statute is that of the Permanent Court with a few minor
changes, the majority of which adjust the Court to the United Na-
tions framework.
In accordance with the traditional system of international law,
the Court adjudicates only disputes between States. However, a
claim of an individual, if presented by his government, acquires
such a character, and the Court has jurisdiction.3 2
The Court has the characteristics of a judicial body, as its com-
position (with the exception of the judges ad hoc) is independent
of the parties to the disputes it adjudicates, and as it is not set up to
deal with a particular case, but is permanent. But the Statute of
the Court follows the traditional principles of international law in
that its jurisdiction is not compulsory. The consent to submission
by the parties to a dispute is required. 33
The Committee of Jurists who drafted the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court intended to confer compulsory jurisdiction on the Court
in some specified types of cases. Unfortunately, the Council and
the Assembly of the League of Nations would not accept such a
progressive rule.34
Similar suggestions were made and supported by delegates of
many States, in particular those of some small powers, early in the
U. N.'s development.3 5 Unfortunately, once again they were op-
posed by other powers, in particular by the United States and the
Soviet Union,8 6 and were rejected.3 7 The opposition of the U.S.S.R.
32. E.g. the Mavrommatis cases, judgments No. 2, 5, 10.
33. Art. 36 1 of the Court's Statute: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to it .. .
34. See, e.g., GooDRIcu AND HAIeBRO, CHARTm OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COM-
MENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 259 (1946).
35. "The Committee also studied the problem of compulsory jurisdiction. A
majority of members appeared to be desirous that such jurisdiction should be es-
tablished by a clause inserted in the revised Statute, so that, as the latter was to
become an integral part of the U.N. Charter, compulsory jurisdiction would be an
element of the future International Organization." I.C.J. YEARBOoK 1946-1947, p. 19.
36. LiSSITzYN, op. cit. supra Note 9 at 61-2.
37. "Other amendments (to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals) were offered to
distinguish between legal and political questions, and to require the submission of
the former to judicial settlement. Most of these were answered by the decision
not to give compulsory jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice"
(U. S. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference,
June 26th, 1945. U. S. Dept. of State, Publ. 2349).
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to compulsory or quasi-compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is un-
derstandable if we consider the basic foundations of the commu-
nistic ideology, according to which the fight between the "capi-
talists" and the "proletarians" will continue until the whole world
is organized on a communistic basis, and any modus vivendi between
the States governed by the "capitalists" on one side, and the
"proletarians" on the other, can be only a temporary compromise.38
But the position of the United States does not seem to be justifiable.
The fact that the United States delegates were concerned about the
"advice and consent" of the Senate, explains their position at the
Conference, but not that of the United States as a whole.
Thus, neither under the League of Nations nor the United Na-
tions system, was the jurisdiction of the International Court made
compulsory. Under the League of Nations Covenant, the member
States agreed only in a general way that, "if there should arise
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture," they would
submit it either to arbitral or judicial proceedings or to inquiry by
the Council (Article 12). The disputes considered as suitable for
submission to arbitral or judicial settlement were enumerated, and
were to be referred either to the Permanent Court or to "any tri-
bunal agreed on by the parties" (Article 13).
The system of the Covenant was supplemented by subsequent
conventions by which it was sought to make the resort to the Per-
manent Court or to the arbitral procedure as frequent as possible.
The most famous were the Protocol of Geneva of 1924 (which, how-
ever, failed to be ratified), and the General Act of 1928, submitting
to judicial settlement or arbitration disputes in which "respective
rights" of the parties were contested, or, in other words, legal
disputes. The General Act was revived, with some changes, by
the General Assembly of the United Nations which recommended
its adoption by the States in 1948. The new General Act entered
into force on September 20, 1950, after having been ratified by two
States: Belgium and Sweden.3 9
In Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the U. N. Charter, the member
States declared that they "shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means." In Article 33, Section 1, they agreed to seek
38. LlsslTzyx, op. cit. supra note 9 at 63: "The Soviet position appears to derive
from the Marxist theory that law is based on the will of the ruling classes. The
interests and policies of the Soviet and the capitalist states are viewed as being
so basically opposed that impartial adjudication of disputes of any importance
between them is believed to be virtually impossible." Thus, the Soviet Union can-
not agree to the compulsory jurisdiction of a court composed in majority of judges
who share "capitalist" ideas.
39. For comments, see Delbez, L'evolution des Idees en Matiere de Reglement
Pacifique des Conflits, 55 Rav. GEN. DR. INT. PUB. 5 (1951).
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the solution of "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,"
first of all, by resorting to the traditional procedures, judicial set-
tlement included, or "other peaceful means of their own choice."
Further, in accordance with Article 36, the Security Council, in
making recommendations to the parties, will take into considera-
tion "that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by
the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with
the provisions of the Statute of the Court. '40 Thus, the Security
Council is limited to a recommendation that the dispute be sub-
mitted to the Court-it cannot itself confer the jurisdiction of the
case upon the Court. Thus far, the Security Council made the
recommendation to refer a dispute to the Court in only one case,
the Corfu Channel dispute between Great Britain and Albania.4 1
Chapter XIV (Articles 92-96) of the U. N. Charter is devoted
to the International Court of Justice, "the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations" (Article 92). Evidently the establishment
of other tribunals is contemplated. All members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (Article 93, Paragraph 1), and other States may
become parties to it (Article 92, Paragraph 2).
The above mentioned provision of Article 93 of the Charter is
the only progress, however slight, made by the Charter as compared
with the Covenant, in respect to the judicial settlement of inter-
national disputes. But, since the Charter has developed and favored
more the political than the judicial methods of settlement of dis-
putes, it is often considered a step backward. 42 It is very well that
all the member States of the United Nations may resort to the
Court, in accordance with Article 93 of the Charter. They don't
have any duty to do so, however, and, as as matter of fact, they do
not resort to the Court often enough. Prior to 1949, only one con-
tentious case-the above-mentioned Corfu Channel case-and two
requests for advisory opinions were submitted to the International
40. From the last proviso of Art 36, it might be inferred that the Security
Council's recommendation depends on the acceptance of the optional clause by the
parties; GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra Note 34 at 151.
41. The text of c. VIII, §A, 116 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the U.N.
Charter could be interpreted as meaning that the Security Council itself may submit
a justifiable dispute between two States to the Court. This wording had been re-
drafted in San Francisco; see GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra Note 34 at 151.
In spite of the redrafting, in the Corfu Channel case, Great Britain contended that
the recommendation of the Security Council had a compulsory character. As
Albania subsequently gave its consent to be sued, the Court did not examine the
British contention.
42. See note 21 supra and other observations of Mr. Delbez in his article, Kunz,
Swing of the Pendulum, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 135 (1950).
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Court of Justice.48 The disuse of the Court became a matter of
concern for the General Assembly of the United Nations, which,
on November 14, 1947, recommended that the member States sub-
mit their legal disputes to the Court and to accept the optional
clause provided for in Article 36 of the Court's Statute.4 In 1949,
the business of the Court increased. Six cases were submitted
(three contentious cases and three requests for advisory opinions),
and in 1950, three cases were filed.
Both the system of the League of Nations and of the United
Nations, as well as a few treaties, provided for the compulsory sub-
mission to the Court of certain disputes relating to some specified
special problems. For example, the peace treaties after the first
World War made the Permanent Court competent for the adjudi-
cation of disputes in cases concerning national minorities, transit,
international mandates, navigation on some rivers, etc. By virtue
of Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
the provisions of other treaties (e.g., of alliance, commercial, trans-
port and communication, etc.), concluded before 1945 and confer-
ring jurisdiction on the Permanent Court, were considered
applicable to the International Court of Justice. Many disputes,
involving technical organs of the League were also submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Court.
Under the United Nations system, some constitutions of the
specialized agencies and some bilateral and multilateral conventions,
including trusteeship agreements, provide for settlement of dis-
putes by submitting them to the International Court.45 Similar
43. Submitted by the British Government on May 22nd, 1947; see I.CJ. YEAR-
BoOK 1946-1947, 121; special agreement Albano-British, March 25th, 1948; see
I.C.J. YEanooK 1949-1950 p. 41.
44. The full text of the resolution is as follows:
The General Assembly,
Considering that, in virtue of Article 1 of the Charter, international disputes
should be settled in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law;
Considering that the International Court of Justice could settle or assist in
settling such disputes if, by the full application of the provisions of the Charter
and of the Statute of the Court, more frequent use were made of its services:
1. Draws the attention of the States which have not yet accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 35, Paragraphs 2 and 5, of the
Statute, to the desirability of the greatest possible number of States accepting
this jurisdiction with as few reservations as possible;
2. Draws the attention of States Members to the advantage of inserting in con-
ventions and treaties arbitration clauses providing, without prejudice to Article
95 of the Charter, for the submission of disputes which may arise from the
interpretation or application of such conventions or treaties, preferably and as
far as possible to the International Court of Justice;
3. Recommends as a general rule that States should submit their legal disputes
to the International Court of Justice. (I.C.J. YEAnooK 1947-1948, 20).
45. For complete lists, see I.C.J. YFARBooK 1949-1950, 37-39 and 179-193.
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provisions are contained in some recent commercial treaties entered
into by the United States and other countries. 46
The Optional Clause: Quasi-Compulsory Adjudication of
Disputes; the Reservations
Progress in the history of the international judicial function was
made by the inclusion, in the Court's statute, of the optional clause.
Its application renders the jurisdiction of the International Court
quasi-compulsory in some types of litigation not restricted to any
special field of international intercourse.
The clause, embodied in Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Court's
Statute, reads as follows:
"The states parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and with-
out special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal
disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation."
Article 36, Paragraph 3 supplements the foregoing provisions
by stating that:
"The declaration referred to above may be made uncondi-
tionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several
or certain states, or for a certain time."
By virtue of the optional clause, many States may be obligated
to submit a large number of potential disputes to the Court without
ever having concluded specific agreements to that effect. Unfor-
tunately, the declarations accepting the clause are too often quali-
fied by conditions and reservations47 which may render the effect
of the declaration practically nil. Thus, the British acceptance of
192948 was subject to certain reservations, the most important of
which restricted the application of the optional clause to disputes
"with regard to situations of facts subsequent to the . . . declar-
ation." This reduction in scope may be interpreted in various
manners, and, as a bad example always finds followers, has been
repeated by some other countries.49
46. Llssn'zyN, op. cit. supra note 9 at 68.
47. For most common types of reservations, see HUDsoN, INTERNATIONAL TRI-
BUNALS 76-7 (1944).
48. Confirmed on Feb. 20, 1940; see I.C.J. YEAPooC 1949-1950, 176.
49. E.g., India, Feb. 28, 1940, or Iran, Oct. 2, 1930; see I.CJ. YEAnooK 1949-
1950, 170.
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The United States reservations were not less far reaching.5 0
President Truman declared, on August 14, 1946,51 that the United
States accepted the optional clause, but excluded its application
to:
"a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust
to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in
existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of
America as determined by the United States of America; or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all
parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also
parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United
States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction . .. ."
The second of the three reservations is commonly called the
"Connally Amendment," and the third, the "Vandenberg Amend-
ment." Fortunately, another reservation suggested by Mr. John
Foster Dulles was not adopted.5 2
It is obvious that if all States made similar reservations, the
value of the optional clause would wane. In practice, the quasi-
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would give way, in most
cases, to the determination, by the States interested, of their will-
ingness or unwillingness to submit the dispute to the International
Court. This has been bluntly stated in respect to cases involving
multilateral treaties (the Vandenberg Amendment, Paragraph 2) .53
As to the Connally Amendment, it may be observed that a great
number of disputes involve some international and some domestic
elements. Whether the disputed matter is "essentially" within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State is often problematical. It is natural
that the parties will tend to interpret any question involving their
vital interests as a domestic matter; the Aaland Islands case,
the Morocco Nationality Decrees case, or the recent Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. case furnish good examples of the approach of the in-
terested parties to the domestic jurisdiction concept. If a party to
a dispute reserves the right to pass upon the question by itself, who
50. The United States never acceded to the Permanent Court; a resolution,
providing for the U.S. membership in the Court, failed to obtain the advice and
consent of 2/3 of the Senate; 52 out of 88 votes were cast in its favor in 1935.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALs 155 (1944).
51. I.C.J. YEARBOOK 1946-1947, p. 217.
52. The proposal involved "disputes where the law necessary for decision is not
found in existing treaties and conventions to which the United States is a party and
where there has not been prior agreement by the United States as to applicable
principles of international law"; LissrrzyN, op. cit. supra Note 9 at 65 n. 46.
53. The debates in the Senate revealed that the Senators feared that the United
States may be exposed "to the possibility of actually losing a case it might want
to win... Senator Austin . . .attempted to allay his colleagues' fears by pointing
out that the Court does not have power to compel execution of its judgments";
Gilmore, The Interzational Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 n. 13 (1946).
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may check the reasonableness of its determination? Similar prob-
lems arose in the Security Council when it was sought to determine
whether some matters were substantive or procedural.
The Connally Amendment may be compared to the assumption of
a State of the United States of the right to decide whether some
litigation raised only state law questions, or involved federal law,
to the exclusion of the federal courts. It has been much criticized,
and the American Bar Association resolved that it should be with-
drawn.54 Needless to add, the United States example has been
followed by other countries, like France,55 Mexico 56 and Pakistan.57
The threat to the quasi-compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
made by the reservations is reinforced by the principle of mutual-
ity, which enables not only the party which made the reservation,
but the other party to a dispute as well to object to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court on the ground that the problem is covered by the
reservation.
An example of the difficult jurisdiction questions posed by a re-
served optional clause is the recent Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case. In
May, 1951, the British Government addressed to the Registrar of
the Court a written application to institute proceedings in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. dispute, by virtue of Article 40, Paragraph 1
of the Court's Statute.5 8 The jurisdiction of the Court was invoked
by virtue of the fact 59 that the Iranian Government unilaterally
terminated the concession granted the Company (a British Cor-
poration). The granting agreement of 1933 between the Iranian
Government and the Company provided that if any litigation should
arise between the parties, it would be adjudicated by arbitration.
The Iranian Government refused to give effect to this provision,
asserting that its nationalization program rested on Iranian sov-
ereignity and could not be submitted to any arbitration.
Great Britain accepted the optional clause, with reservations.
Iran accepted only Article 36, Paragraph 2(a) of the Court's
Statute,60 restricting it to "situations or facts relating ... to the
application of treaties or conventions accepted by Persia and sub-
54. 33 A.B.A.J. 249 (1947): "Resolved . . . That .. . the Association is of the
opinion that the prestige and authority of the Court and the leadership of the
United States in behalf of the peaceful settlement of international disputes require
that a further step be taken, through withdrawal of the reservation put in the
Declaration by virtue of the Connally Amendment. ..."
55. Feb. 18, 1947; see I.C.J. YERsooK 1949-1950, 169.
56. Oct. 23, 1947; Id. at 172.
57. June 22, 1948; Id. at 173.
58. "Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the
notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the
Registrar....!
59. Bishop, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. 3. INTL L. 749 (1951).
60. Fenwick, The Order of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 723, 725 (1951); conditions of the
Iranian declaration: I.C.J. YEmooK 1949-1950, p. 170.
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sequent to the ratification of this declaration." 61 Further reserva-
tions excluded the application of the optional clause to disputes
concerning questions which, by international law, were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Iran. The Iranian declaration was made
in 1930 and ratified in 1932.
According to the agreement of 1928 between Great Britain and
Iran, and the most favored nation clause of other treaties concluded
between the two countries, Iran was to treat the British nationals
in conformity with the principles of international law. Further,
the British contended that the concession agreement should be
regarded as a "convention" covered by the Iranian declaration of
acceptance of the optional clause.
In June, 1951, Great Britain requested the Court to order some
provisional measures of protection of the Company's interests.62
The request was granted in Julyj 1951, in accordance with Article
41 of the Court's Statute.63
The Government of Iran challenged the Court's jurisdiction,
asserting that the problem was essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of Iran. This argument was met by the British con-
tention that the refusal to submit the dispute to an arbitration was
a denial of justice, 64 contrary to the customary law of nations.
But even if by the agreement of 1928, Iran was to treat the British
nationals in accordance with the principles of international law, it
is not certain whether, by virtue of the Iranian declaration, ratified
in 1932, the case would be submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court, as the word "subsequent" used in the
declaration seems to refer to "treaties and conventions" rather
than to "situations or facts." It is doubtful, too, whether the conces-
sion agreement, concluded between a State and a corporation, may
be treated as a "convention" covered by the Iranian declaration.
These problems will be decided when the Court passes on its juris-
diction to adjudicate the case. In the meantime, it is interesting
to note that the Court issued a provisional order in spite of the
fact that Iran denied its consent to submit the case to the Court.
61. A similar but less ambiguous reservation contained in the acceptance of the
optional clause by France was examined by the Court in the Phosphates in Morocco
case, Judgment of June 14, 1938 (P.C.Ij. Publications, Series A/B, No. 74, p. 21).
The French declaration referred only to disputes involving situations or facts
subsequent to the ratification of the declaration. The Court held that Italy could
not maintain the suit as the ratification took place in April, 1931, and acts com-
plained of related to a decision of the Dept. of Mines of January, 1925.
62. Fenwick, op. cit. supra note 60 at 723.
63. Article 41: "1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers
that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final decision, notice
of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the
Security Council."
64. Fenwick, op cit. supra Note at 726.
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Although by issuing the order, the Court, did not assume juris-
diction, but only indicated that it considered its jurisdiction possi-
ble,65 it made it clear that the parties to the dispute will not be
asked what was the scope of their consent to the Court's jurisdiction
in their acceptance of the optional clause, and that the Court itself
will interpret the declaration. The position taken by the Court
should be greeted with approval.
While speaking of the quasi-compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
rendered possible by the optional clause, it is worth noting that
still another step towards granting the Court some features of a
purely judicial institution, similar to those of municipal courts,
are the interpleader rules, embodied in Articles 6266 and 6367 of
the Statute. The Court itself decides whether or not to grant the
request of a third party to intervene, without any expression of
consent of the parties to the dispute. If the litigation involves the
construction of a multilateral convention, any party to it may
intervene ipso jure.68
Advisory Opinions: Quasi-Compulsory Adjudication
Another device rendering possible an extension of the court's
quasi-compulsory judisdiction - the advisory opinion procedure -
may result in a compulsory quasi-adjudication of disputes. Article
14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations empowered the Coun-
cil and the Assembly to request advisory opinions from the Court.
Provisions dealing with advisory opinions were inserted in the
Court's Statute in 1929 at Chapter IV, Articles 65-68. Slight
amendments were made in 1945 to Article 65, Paragraph 1:
"The court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question
at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make
such a request."69
Article 96, Paragraph I of the U.N. Charter empowers the
General Assembly and the Security Council to submit requests for
65. Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha dissented on the ground that the Court,
in order to issue a provisional order, should find that its jurisdiction is reasonably
probable, not only possible.
66. "1. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which
may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court
to be permitted to intervene. 2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this
request."
67. "1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which statds other than
those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all
such states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene. . .
68. For comments, see ScELLE, op. cit. supra Note 11 at 564-5.
69. In the Statute of the Permanent Court, the word "legal" was absent. The
change of phraseology makes some commentators believe that the possibility of
taking recourse to the advisory opinion procedure under the U.N. system had been
narrowed.
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advisory opinions. According to Article 96, Paragraph 2, other
organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations may do so
upon authorization of the General Assembly.
The advisory opinion has been resorted to often and has been
almost as authoritative as a judgment-during the whole existence
of the Permanent Court, the parties concerned always complied.
Although formally, they were not bound to accept the Court's
opinion, 70 they were not prone to risk the general reprobation of
the world's opinion. It is true, however, that after the Eastern
Carelia case, the League of Nations was careful not to submit to
the Court any request for advisory opinions if one of the parties
involved expressly objected to it.
In the Eastern Carelia case,7 1 in accordance with its resolution
of April 21, 1923, the Council of the League of Nations requested
the Court to give its opinion as to the question of whether:
".... articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty of Peace between Finland
and Russia, signed at Dorpat on Oct. 14th, 1920, and the
annexed Declaration of the Russian Delegation regarding the
autonomy of Eastern Carelia, constitute engagements of an
international character which place Russia under an obliga-
tion to Finland as to the carrying out of the provisions con-
tained therein ?"
As stated in the Court's reply of July 23, 1923,72 Mr. Tchitcherin,
the Russian People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, on June 11,
1923, dispatched, to the Court, a telegram stating that there were
"reasons which render it quite impossible for the Russian Govern-
ment to take any part in the discussion of the Carelia question be-
fore the Permanent Court."
The Court took the position that it could not assume jurisdiction
over the case, pointing out that
"It is well established in international law that no State can,
without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with
other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any
other kind of pacific settlement. Such consent can be given
once and for all in the form of an obligation freely undertaken,
but it can, on the contrary, also be given in a special case apart
from any existing obligation. The first alternative applies to
the Members of the League who, having accepted the Cov-
enant, are under the obligation resulting from the provisions
of this pact dealing with the pacific settlement of international
disputes. As concerns States not members of the League,
the situation is quite different; they are not bound by the
70. This fact has been stressed by Finland in its memorandum to the Council
of the League of Nations concerning the Eastern Carelia case in August, 1923
(4 L.N. Official Journal 1497-1501, 1923).
71. P.C.I.J. Publications, Series B (Collection of Advisory Opinions), Nr. 5.
72. Although the Court declined to give an advisory opinion, its reply has been
printed in the advisory opinions collection, and is called "advisory opinion Nr. 5."
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Covenant. The submission, therefore, of a dispute between
them and a member of the League for solution according to the
methods provided for in the Covenant, could take place only by
virtue of their consent . . . The Court is aware of the fact
that is it not requested to decide a dispute, but to give an
advisory opinion. This circumstance, however, does not essen-
tially modify the above considerations . . . Answering the
question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the
dispute between the parties. The Court, being a Court of
Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from
the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court."
By virtue of Article 65 of the Statute, the Court may give an
advisory opinion; thus it is not obligated, but is endowed with the
power to do so. However, the Court did not decline to give an
opinion while holding it had the power to do so. It held that it had
no competence to deal with the case.73
By its approach to the question of consent, the Court made it
clear that it was not disposed to undermine the traditional rules of
international law. It seems, however, that it might have rendered
an opinion,74 without any direct derogation to the principle of
consent, since the advisory opinion is not a judgment, has no
res judicata effect and does not preclude any further litigation,
although in most cases, the result of further litigation would be
predetermined. Thus can there be quasi-compulsory effect, similar
to that arising from the optional clause, on the penumbra of the
advisory opinion.7 5
In spite of the assertion of the Court that it cannot "depart from
the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court," the very
concept of the advisory opinion is contrary to the character of the
Court as a purely judicial organ in all cases. The function of a
judicial tribunal is merely to render judgments, while by answering
the requests to give advisory opinions, the Court "sets aside its
competence as a judicial organ," 76 and the judges act as juris-
consults.7 7 It has been asserted that the prestige of the Court would
73. Only eleven judges sat in the case. Four judges dissented leaving seven in
the majority.
74. This power of the Court was well understood by the U.S. Senate, which
adopted the following reservation, among others, in case the U.S. adhere to the
Permanent Court: "Nor shall (the Court) without the consent of the United States
entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in
which the United States has or claims an interest."
75. The role of an advisory opinion is still more similar to that of a judicial
opinion if the parties agree in advance that they will comply with it; for examples,
see LlssrrzyN, op. cit. supra note 9 at 88, n. 89.
76. ScELLE, op. cit. supra note 11 at 566.
77. "That a Court should be asked for an opinion on theoretical questions may
seem strange. But it must not be forgotten that the International Court of Justice
has a double character: that of tribunal, and that of counsellor. And it is quite
fitting for an advisory body to give an answer in abstracto which may eventually be
applied to several de facto situations ... .", individual opinion by Judge Azevedo in
the Admission to Membership in the U.N. case, I.C.J. Reports, 1948, p. 74.
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not increase if its advisory opinions were bluntly disregarded by a
party which did not consent to its jurisdiction. On the other hand,
it may be argued that it is more advisable clearly to put the blame
on the party which does not act in accordance with international
law, than to decline to deal with the problem and enable the State
concerned to assert that no rule of international law had been vio-
lated.7 1 Of course, this argument is valid also in respect to the
parties' consent to the rendering, by the Court, of judgments as
well as advisory opinions, but the Court was by no means em-
powered to change the traditional rules of international law relating
to judgments. It was offered the possibility, however, to promote
the development of the Law of Nations by establishing a new kind
of a quasi-compulsory jurisdiction; it did not take advantage of
this opportunity.7 9
The International Court of Justice has been more daring than
the Permanent Court of International Justice. A hint of the new
trend may be found in the fact that it assumed the competence
to give an advisory opinion in the Conditions of Admission of a
State to Membership in the United Nations case,8 0 without inquir-
ing whether the consent of the U.S.S.R. had been secured.8 ' Al-
though the request for an advisory opinion was couched in general
terms and involved the interpretation of the Charter, it was clear
that it referred to the concrete fact 'that Soviet Russia vetoed the
recommendation of the Security Council for admission of some
States to the United Nations.8 2
This reversal of attitude by the Court toward its duties regarding
advisory opinions was clearly revealed in the Interpretation of
Peace Treaties case.83 Involved here were violations of treaties
by the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania in not
appointing members to the treaty commissions, provided for to
deal with disputes concerning the interpretation and execution of
the treaties. The merits of the disputes involved constant vio-
78. See also infra.
79. For the opinion that the Court was right in declining its jurisdiction in the
Eastern Carelia case, see e.g. Gilmore, International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J.
1049, 1059 (1946); for criticism, see e.g. Hudson, The Twenty-ninth Year of the
World Court, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1951).
80. I.C.J. Reports, 1948, p. 57.
81. The Admission to Membership case may be distinguished from the Eastern
Carelia case on several grounds (in the latter, Soviet Russia was not a member of
the League of Nations; in the former, it was a member of the United Nations;
in the latter, the question referred to the interpretation of the Charter without any
reference to the U.S.S.R.'s contention; in the former, Soviet Russia's position was
clearly challenged, etc.) ; but the question of consent was involved in both cases.
82. "In the period from 1922 to 1935, twenty-eight requests for advisory opinions
were made to the Court by the Council of the League of Nations. None of them
related to an abstract question"; HUDSON, INTEMRATioNAL TaRBuALs 81 (1944).
83. I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 65 and 221.
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lations, on the part of the three States, of the human rights of
their inhabitants by ruthless persecution and extermination of any
opposition,8 in disregard of the peace treaties.
Arguments were advanced that the Court should decline to
take jurisdiction of the case because the three States were neither
members of the United Nations system nor of the International
Court, and that they opposed the Court's advisory procedure. It
was contended by some States submitting statements to the Court
that the Court could not ". .. give the Advisory Opinion requested
without violating the well established principle of international
law according to which no judicial proceedings relating to a legal
question pending between States can take place without their
consent."
To these contentions the Court properly answered that:
"This objection reveals a confusion between the principles
governing contentious procedure and those which are applica-
ble to Advisory Opinions. The consent of States, parties to
a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in conten-
tious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory
proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates
to a legal question actually pending between States. The
Court's reply is only of an advisory character; as such, it
has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a
Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving
of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to
be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course
of action it should take . .. ."
The Court tried to distinguish the Eastern Carelia case and held
that the circumstances of that case were "profoundly different"
because there:
"... the question.., was directly related to the main point of
a dispute actually pending between two States, so that an-
swering the question would be substantially equivalent to
deciding the dispute between the parties, and ... at the same
time it raised a question of fact which could not be elucidated
without hearing both parties. As has been observed, the pres-
ent Request for an Opinion is solely concerned with the appli-
cability to certain disputes of the procedure for settlement
instituted by the Peace Treaties, and it is justifiable to con-
clude that it in no way touches the merits of those disputes
... It follows that the legal position of the parties to these
84. Of course, similar disregard of human rights is a practice of the govern-
ments of other "Iron Curtain" countries, too. However, as these States were on
the side of the Allied Powers during the War, no peace treaties or other conven-
tions requiring their respect of human rights have been concluded with them, and
the United Nations did not intervene in their "domestic matters," although it seems
that it might have done so by virtue of the Charter provisions about the human
rights.
1952]
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disputes cannot be in any way compromised by the answers
that the Court may give to the Questions put to it. ' ' 85
The terse distinguishing of the Eastern Carelia case, right after
the Court held that it could deliver advisory opinions even where
a dispute on the same point was pending between States, is sur-
prising. The distinction made by the Court is based on narrow
grounds and seems without much merit. It is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to find, in the very few existing judicial opinions of inter-
national courts, two cases quite identical. The basic problem in
the instant cases was the same--the interpretation and imple-
mentation of an international treaty. The question whether the
treaty provisions involved substantive or procedural matters is
secondary. Actually, in both cases, the Court faced a plain violation
of an international treaty.
/
One of the differences between the Permanent Court and the
International Court of Justice is the fact that the latter ".
has been raised to the status of a principal organ and thus more
closely geared into the mechanism of the United Nations Organiza-
tion . . ." and therefore it ". . . must do its utmost to co-operate
with the other organs with a view to attaining the aims and
principles that have been set forth. .. ,,16 This difference, how-
ever, should not affect the duties of the Court. Therefore, if the
Court were to follow its attitude taken in the Eastern Careli
case, it should have declined to give an advisory opinion, and if
we agree with this attitude, we should also agree with the separate
opinion by Judge Azevedo in the Peace Treaties case. 87 The con-
tention of Judge Azevedo and of Judges Winiarski,8 8 Zoricic8 9
and Krylow, 90 in their dissents, that both cases should not have
been distingished, seems to be well founded.91 The inference should
85. I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 72.
86. Separate Opinion by Judge Azevedo, Interpretation of Peace Treaties case,
I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 79, 82.
87. "But there are certain limits which a judicial court may not overstep, even
in the exercise of an advisory function assigned to it as a subsidiary activity. For
instance, the absence of consent without doubt constitutes a non possmnus which
the Court will be obliged to declare . .. The recognition that there is no clause
restricting the power or duty of giving advisory opinions is not sufficient ground
for concluding that the consent of the States directly concerned is not required."
Id. at 82-3.
88. Id. at 89, 102-4.
89. "The precedent of Eastern Carelia constitutes . . . a convincing proof that
the consent of the States is necessary, not only in regard to contentious cases, but
also in advisory cases. . . ." Id. at 98, 103.
90. Judge Krylow distinguished advisory opinions which do and do not deal with
a legal question actually pending between the States (Id. at 105, 106), and likened
the Eastern Carelia case to the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case.
91. "The analogy with the case of Eastern Carelia is thus very striking, for
there again the issue was not the merits of the dispute, but a preliminary question
which, while necessarily affecting the examination of the case and the final settle-
ment, did not, strictly speaking .... prejudge the substance of the dispute."
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be, however, not that the Court should decline to give the advisory
opinion, but that it should overrule its position taken in the East-
ern Carelia case. It seems that the Court is not prone expressly
to overrule its holdings.92 As Professor Lissitzyn observed, the
Court ".... has never admitted that any two of its judgments or
opinions have been inconsistent . . . Where there is danger that
the Court will be accused of inconsistency, it takes pains to 'dis-
tinguish' its previous action in a manner very reminiscent of the
traditional technique of getting around precedents used by the
Anglo-American common law courts and lawyers. '93
It is hardly necessary to add that neither Bulgaria, Hungary
nor Rumania changed their attitude after the advisory opinion
was delivered.94 As this fact could have been easily foreseen,
some commentators expressed the opinion that it would have been
better, for the prestige of the Court, to decline to take jurisdiction,
just as in the Eastern Carelia case.95 This point, however, should
not be controlling. No court should take into consideration the
question whether its holdings will be complied with or not, and it
cannot decline to pass upon a case if it presumes that its judgment
(or advisory opinion) will not be respected by the parties involved.
There is no connection between the pure function of passing upon
a case and the execution of the decree. The last function belongs
to the executive, and not to the judicial power. Therefore, the
prestige of the Court cannot be diminished by the fact that its
opinion is disregarded by a party. It is only the lack of any power
of execution of the international community which is responsible
for the persisting anarchy in international relations,96 and this
power should enforce the decisions of its political as well as
judicial organs.97 It is clear, however, that as long as no power
of execution exists, the opinions of the Court may be disregarded.
The recent controversy over the status of South-West Africa is a
92. In spite of the fact, that from a strictly formal point of view, the Permanent
Court was another court.
93. LlssTzyx, op. cit. supra Note 9 at 19.
94. After the advisory opinion had been given, Rumania still contended that the
Court, assuming its jurisdiction, acted in violation of international law because it
"has taken upon itself the right to express an opinion on a question concerning
Romania, without Romanian Government's consent." Similar statements were made
by Bulgaria and Hungary. Hudson, The Twenty-ninth Year of the World Court, 45
Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1951).
95. E.g. Llsslrzy, op. cit. supra Note 9 at 93.
96. For an unpersuasive criticism of the idea of the world's community power
of execution, see Borchard, The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations,
37 Aie. J. INf'L L. 46 (1943).
97. "Compulsion is necessary for the reign of peace"; Decenti6re-Ferrandi6re,
Essai Critique sur la Justice Internationale, 41 REv. GEN. DR. INT. PuB. 148, 171(1934).
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good example in respect to advisory opinions,98 as the Corfu
Channei case is in respect to judgments.
Giving effect to the resolution of the General Assembly of Dec. 6,
1949, the Court gave an advisory opinion on July 11, 1950,99
holding that the Union of South Africa, acting alone, "has not the
competence to ... modify the international status of the Territory
(of South-West Africa)," and that the Territory continues to be
"under the international mandate assumed by the Union."
The Union of South Africa, which had declined to give any effect
to the repetitious resolutions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, made it clear that it did not consider itself bound
by the advisory opinion which, as the Union contended, might con-
stitute an intervention in its internal affairs. 0 0 The Union's
consistent disregard of any recommendations or opinions of inter-
national organs in the South-West Africa case and on other occa-
sions, 0 1 raises one of the serious problems before the U.N.-how
to deal with one of its members which shows a considerable amount
of bad faith in its approach to the questions of international life.
The adjudication of international disputes is in principle still not
compulsory, although progress has been made, and a quasi-com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court has been made pos-
sible. By virtue of Article 36, Paragraph 6 of the Statute, 0 2 the
Court itself is the judge of the scope of its jurisdiction. It should
exercise its power not in the light of the static, stiff and obsolete
principles, but in conformity with the necessities of the develop-
ment of international law and relations.
The optional clause's effect is sometimes called "voluntary
compulsory jurisdiction." This term stresses the necessity of
prior consent to the Court's jurisdiction in respect to disputes
which may arise in the future, and, in a great majority of cases,
the States which agree to a judicial settlement, carry out the de-
cisions of the Court. In Article 94, Paragraph 1 of the Charter,
the member States undertook "to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which [it is] a party."
This provision does not confer any new duties upon the members
of the United Nations, but is merely declaratory of the old rule
of law, municipal or international, which is binding upon members
98. Although strictly legally advisory opinions are not binding, non-compliance
with them shows a disregard of the principles of international law, stated by the
Court.
99. I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 128.
100. The United Nations and Africa, in MAJOR PROBLEMS OF U.S. FOREIGN
PoLIcY, 1951-1952, 295 (published by the Brookings Institute).
101. In particular, in the case of discrimination against the Indians in the Union.
102. "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
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and non-members of the United Nations. However, as was stated
above, so long as there is no power of execution in international
life, international law may be disregarded. As proof that it is,
witness the Corfu Channel case. There, Albania, which consented
to submit the dispute to the Court, declined to give effect to the
Court's judgment of Dec. 15, 1949, fixing the amount of the dam-
ages to be paid to Great Britain 03 and challenged the competence
of the Court to rule on damages.104 Article 94, Paragraph 2 of the
Charter empowers the Security Council not only to make recom-
mendations, but also to take decisions "upon measures to be taken
to give effect to the judgment" when a party to the dispute takes
recourse to the Council. However, this provision, juxtaposed with
Article 94, Paragraph 1, seems to be applicable only to the mem-
bers of the United Nations. The extension of the principles of the
Charter to non-members of the U. N., provided for by Article 2,
Paragraph 6, is applicable only to cases where the "maintenance
of international peace and security" is involved. Albania's non-
compliance did not endanger the international peace and therefore,
Great Britain did not take recourse to the Security Council. Be-
sides, even if Article 94, Paragraph 2 were construed to be ap-
plicable to non-members of the U. N., and if the Council could agree
to make a recommendation or to take a decision (assuming that
the U. S. S. R., the sponsor of the Albanian Government, did not
use the veto), it was clear that any measure short of the use of
force would have no effect. Thus, the only consequence of its non-
compliance was that the Albanian Government was recorded in
the history of the International judiciary as the first ever to dis-
regard a judgment of The Hague Court.
New Proposals and Developments
No one consideres satisfactory the existing state of things in
the field of international adjudication of disputes. Therefore, it is
quite natural that new proposals to improve the situation are con-
tinuously advanced. Some call for gradual change; others for a
radical and immediate transformation of the whole structure
103. I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 244. In the previous judgment of April 9, 1949(I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 4), the Court held that Albania was liable to the United
Kingdom for the explosions which occurred in Albanian waters and which resulted
in damages and loss of human lives. The amount of compensation was not fixed
because evidence with regard thereto was not produced and because Albania did
not state what sums it contested.
104. The Albanian contention was based on the fact that Albania consented only
to the submission to the Court of the question of its liability, without right to fix
the amount of the compensation (I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 246); and the Court
rejected it in just a few words: "The Court may confine itself to stating that ...(its) jurisdiction was established by its judgment of April 9th, 1949" (Id. at 248).
1952]
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the world. Some proposals relate to the universal judiciary;
others are restricted to certain regions-for example, the proposed
Inter-American Court of International Justice, competent not only
to adjudicate contentious cases, but also to deliver advisory opin-
ions. 10 5 It is worth noting just a few of these proposals.
The Petition to the General Assembly of the United Nations by
A. Cranston and others10 6 is an example of the "evolutionary"
approach. It suggests some amendments to the U. N. Charter, in
accordance with which, the International Court would be vested
with final authority, at least in interpreting the Charter. Further,
the Security Council would have the power to require 0 7 the sub-
mission of disputes "of so serious a character as to endanger peace,"
to either "the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal,
dependent upon the nature of the dispute."'' 0 8
Another interesting proposal to broaden the scope of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court was advanced by Ecuador. As-
cording to its suggestions, any problem dealt with by any organ of
the U. N., in respect to which there are doubts as to its inter-
national or domestic character, should be referred to the
International Court of Justice in order to determine the problem's
nature. 0 9
On the other hand, in some proposals completely to reorganize
the international community, propositions were advanced that only
a federation of all the States is able to assure a better future for
humanity. The idea of international federalism is becoming more
and more popular, and it is impossible to enumerate all the pro-
posals that tens of federalists' associations and scores of authors
advance. Typical is the Draft of a World Constitution, prepared
by the Committee to Frame a World Constitution of Chicago."10
According to the Draft Constitution, the future World Common-
wealth would be headed by a World Government, complete with
the three usual branches of power. "The supreme judiciary power
of the World Republic shall be vested in a Grand Tribunal of sixty
Justices" declares Article 16 of the Draft Constitution. The Trib-
unal shall be composed of five Benches, adjudging cases in accord-
ance with the character of the issues raised (Article 18). The
distribution of cases among the Benches shall be made by the
105. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 81 (1944).
106. See SOHN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS OF WORLD LAW 338 ss. (1950).
107. See supra, p ......
108. This distinction is not correct. There is no difference in the nature of dis-
putes adjudicated either by an arbitral or by a judicial tribunal. The disputes which
are dangerous for the international peace are usually political, and a court of law
(arbitral or judicial) has no jurisdiction to settle them.
109. Delbez, op. cit. supra note 21 at 18.
110. 1 COMMON CAUSE 329 (1948).
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Supreme Court (Article 20), composed of seven members-one
representing each Bench, with the President of the World Repub-
lic as the Chief Justice of the Grand Tribunal, and the Chairman
of the World Council as the Vice-Chairman (Article 19); the
Supreme Court shall be empowered to review the decisions of the
Benches (Article 21). Lower Federal Courts are also provided for
(Article 22). The jurisdiction of the Federal Tribunals would be
compulsory, and in particular, would extend to any questions affect-
ing federal (in other words, international) law (Article 18).
Not all the proposals are as detailed as the one summarized
above. For example, the Sept. 10, 1948 Declaration of the Con-
gress of the World Movement for a World Federal Government,
presents no detailed draft of a World Constitution, but only pro-
motes the idea of drafting and adopting one which should "pro-
vide for a legislature empowered to enact world law, which is to
be carried out and administered by an Executive Agency," and
applied and interpreted by a Judiciary."-'
The transformation of the world structure from the system of
"sovereign" States into a federal union should undoubtedly be
encouraged, but all these proposals, more or less realistic, certainly
will not be realized in the near future.
Other suggestions were advanced to confer upon an international
tribunal not only original, but also appellate jurisdiction, in
respect either to municipal courts or to arbitral awards in inter-
national cases (in particular, where the excis de pouvoir, trans-
gression of the power of an international arbitral tribunal, is as-
serted). By some agreements in the past, the decrees of mixed
arbitral tribunals were subjected to the review of the Permanent
Court."i2 In rare instances, special agreements permitted the re-
litigation, before an international body, of a dispute first passed
upon by municipal courts. Thus, a U. S.-British tribunal took cog-
nizance of certain prize cases decided previously by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 1 3 A direct, general power of review
over the judgments of municipal courts in all cases involving inter-
national law does not seem possible so long as the States stick to
the obsolete concept of "sovereignty." '"A
Proposals to establish special international courts have been
repeatedly advanced since the first international criminal tribunal
111. 2 CoMM oN CAUSE 122 (1948).
112. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBuNALs 82 (1944).
113. HUDSON, INTERNATioNAL TRBUNALS 82 (1944).
114. "(S)tates do not permit appeals from their courts to an international juris-
diction for the reason that such procedure would be incompatible with state-
sovereignty." Finch, Appellate Jurisdiction in International Cases, 43 Am. J. INT'L
L. 88, 90 (1949).
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sat in 1474, to judge Pierre de Hagenbach. 1 5 Suggestions to call
into being such a court having a permanent character, have been
numerous, and have increased since the Nuremberg Trial. 1 6 Other
proposals refer to an international loans tribunal, an international
commercial tribunal, etc.1 7
From among the proposals of legal scholars, that of Professor
Hans Kelsen deserves special mention because of the great authority
of the writer and the persuasiveness of his reasoning."18 Professor
Kelsen would vest the international judiciary with not only the
power to adjudicate legal disputes, but also provide necessary
measures of enforcement.119 At the end of the second World War,
when his work was written, he advocated the concluding of an
international treaty, entered into "by as many States as possible-
victors as well as vanquished--establishing an international court
endowed with compulsory jurisdiction.' 2 0 The U.N. Charter re-
jected the idea of compulsory jurisdiction, but Professor Kelsen's
proposal will remain timely until further progress in the field of
the international adjudication of disputes is made. The compe-
tence of Kelsen's Court is described in Article 31 of the proposed
Covenant, establishing a "Permanent League for the maintenance
of Peace" :121
"1. If there should arise between Members of the League any
dispute, any party to the dispute may submit the matter
to the Court.
2. The Court is competent to decide any dispute between
Members of the League submitted by one of the parties
to the dispute."'122
115. Sottile, Le problme de la criation d'une cour penale internationale perma-
nente, 29 REv. DR. INT. Sc. DiPL. POL. 117, n. 2 (1951).
116. HUDSON, INTERNATiONAL TRIBUNALS 181 (1944); and Sottile, op. cit. supra
Note 115.
117. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRmuNALS 204, 213 (1944).
118. KELSEN PEAcE THROUGH LAW (1944) ; some parts of the booklet have been
published as articles; see e.g. Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International
Disputes, 37 Am. 3. I-rr'I. L. 397 (1943).
119. The author's distinction between political and legal disputes rests in "the
way the parties to the conflict justify their respective attitudes," not in the matter
of the conflict, seems in most cases proper, but the endowing of international courts
with the power of compulsory settlement of both kinds of disputes without qualifi-
cations seems to be too far going, for the time being ("A positive legal order can
always be applied to any conflict whatever," KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 118 at 29).
It is interesting to note, that in the Bogota Pact of 1948, the American States agreed
to submit to a compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice all
disputes, legal and political. (The latter ones to be judged ex- aequo et bono),
if other means of settlement fail; it is fortunate that such an agreement could be
reached, but it seems certain that it could not be adopted by the whole international
community, at least not in the near future.
120. KELSEN, op. Cit. supra note 118 at 20.
121. The scope of action of the proposed League was narrower than that of
the U.N.O., created one year after the publication of the proposal; its chief purpose
was to maintain the peace.
122. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 118 at 137.
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Most proposals will forever remain only on paper, but some of
them may be or even are being realized. Thus, interesting recom-
mendations were adopted at the meeting of the International
Council of the European Movement in Brussels, in February,
1949.123 The establishment of a European Court of Human Rights
was suggested, the object of which would be the judicial protection
of certain "rights of man" to be agreed upon by the members of the
Council of Europe. The Court was to have the power to review
municipal court judgments, provided that local remedies had been
exhausted. Individuals were to be entitled to appear before the
court if they submitted a petition to the European Human Rights
Commission, and if the conciliation of the Commission failed.
The work of the European Movement served as a basis for dis-
cussion for the conclusion of a Convention between the members of
the Council of Europe. The Convention was signed at Rome on
Nov. 4th, 1950, and bears the title, "Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.' 124
The first section of the Convention, referring to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations of Dec. 10th,
1948, determines, in 17 articles, the extent of human rights which
are to be collectively enforced. The next sections establish a
European Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of
Human Rights.
Many suggestions contained in the Brussels recommendations
have been embodied in the Convention. Unfortunately, some im-
portant, progressive proposals have been changed. Thus, according
to Article 48 of the Convention, only the European Commission
of Human Rights 25 and the contracting States may be parties
before the Court. Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has not
been accepted automatically by the parties. Article 46 of the Con-
vention contains an optional clause, according to which "Any of
the High Contracting Parties may at any time declare that it recog-
nizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement the
jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the interpre-
tation and application of the present Convention." Some other
provisions of the Convention are also similar to the rules governing
the functioning of the International Court of Justice.
The Convention has been signed by the representatives of thir-
teen countries, members of the Council of Europe.
123. EuRoPFAN CouRT OF HUMAN RIqTs, EURoPEAN MOVEMENT, 1949.
124. See text in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 24 (1951).
125. Article 20: "The Commission shall consist of a number of members equal
to that of the High Contracting Parties. No two members of the Commission
may be nationals of the same State."
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Prospects for the Future
As described above, the need for compulsory adjudication of
international disputes has been felt for a long time. Even before
the first World War, one international court, limited to a few
Central American States, was established, and the decision to
create an International Prize Court was made by a large number
of States and was nearly realized. Suggestions to provide for com-
pulsory adjudication of disputes, advanced during the formulating
discussions surrounding the League of Nations and the U.N., met
with broad approval, but failed to be accepted.
It is impossible, at the present stage of the development of
international relations, to settle all disputes judicially. The most
dangerous disputes are "political," and cannot be settled by mere
application of the rules of international law. It is true that the
International Court of Justice may adjudicate cases ex aequo et
bono, irrespective of the whole system of the Law of Nations,
but it may do so only on a consensual basis. There has not been,
by any means, a path beaten to the Court's door.
By the creation of the League of Nations and of the United
Nations, the States pledged their belief in international peaceful
co-operation. They determined ".... to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be maintained,' 12 6 and
to adjust international disputes which might lead to a breach of
the peace ". . . in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law."'1 27
In order to give content to these laudable intentions, implementa-
tion, in the form of compulsory adjudication, would seem necessary.
It is illogical to assure willingness to abide by the law and at the
same time to insist upon being judge in one's own cause.
The first step should be the acceptance of the optional clause by
the members of the U.N., without any reservations. As Professor
Lauterpacht properly points out:
".... it must become axiomatic that at a time when nearly
forty States128 have agreed to take the risks ... and to assume
the obligations of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, there is
no convincing justification for the remaining thirty States to
withhold from it such jurisdiction. By the same token, at a
time when ten States have accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court without reservations there can be little justi-
fication for the others to qualify their acceptance by reserva-
126. PREAMBLE, U.N. CHARTER.
127. U.N. CHARTER Article 1, Paragraph 1.
128. Between 1921 and 1940, the optional clause was accepted by 45 States.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 76, 139 (1944).
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tions ... Civilized States cannot in their mutual relations at
the same time profess allegiance to law and deny it in its most
vital aspect."' 12 9
It is difficult to disagree with these propositions. It is sure,
however, that Soviet Russia will never accept the optional clause.
As aforementioned, 130 communism rests on principles so different
from those of the democratic world, that to anyone who is ac-
qainted, although only in general outlines, with the theories of
Marxism, it is doubtful whether long-range co-operation between
the two worlds can be brought about.'3 ' It would seem ideologically
impossible for Soviet Russia (and the governments of some other
countries sponsored by her) to accept any kind of compulsory juris-
diction of any international court. But other countries, believing
in the democratic organization of internal and international life,
have no excuse.
Disregarding the non-unanimity problems posed by Russia's
defection, the next step should be the amendment of the Charter
and the submission of all legal disputes to compulsory adjudication.
Of course, it may be argued that even if the United Nations
adopted the general principle of compulsory jurisdiction, it still
would not constitute any departure from the traditional approach
since the States are free to join international organizations or not,
and if they do join them, they express their consent to the whole
system, including the jurisdiction of an international court. How-
ever, such a voluntary acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
would undeniably constitute great progress. The rules of inter-
national law are usually created out of the consent of the States
and then become mandatory. Customary law, which is the source
of the most stable principles of international law, was or is being
created by the consent of the States to follow some standard of
conduct. Once a principle of law is established, no State can dis-
regard it without becoming a violator of the Law of Nations. For
example, it would be ridiculous to assert today that State X con-
sented to the principle of freedom of the open seas.
Once the principle of compulsory adjudication of international
legal disputes is accepted by the great majority of States, it will
tend to become a settled principle of international law, free of the
consensual prerequisite, though still needing, for its implementa-
tion, the existence of an executive power in the international com-
129. LAUTERPACHT, FOREWORD TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3Y
LIssITzYN (1951).
130. See supra.
131. "The communists .. .oppose international organization, law and adminis-
tration as tools of capitalist imperialism"; Potter, Liberal and Totalitarian Attitudes
Concernzing International Law and Organization, 45 Am. 3. INT'L L. 327, 328 (1951).
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munity. Recently, the International Court of Justice declared that
non-member States of the United Nations cannot disregard the
international community's constitutional law, embodied in the
Charter.13 2 The principles of the Charter must be respected by
non-members at least in cases where international peace is at
stake.133 The next step should be the declaration of still other
principles of the United Nations as binding upon all the States of
the world. Since the natural tendency of an international organi-
zation, based on principles of peaceful co-operation, is to become
universal, this Ex Parte aspect will become progressively less im-
portant. Just as there is greater participation in the U.N. than
there was in the League, possibly a third organization will pro-
claim membership a duty rather than a right. It may be remem-
bered that as early as-in San Francisco, suggestions were advanced
to bar withdrawals from U.N. membership.
The ideal of every international lawyer who believes in the
monistic theory of the Law of Nations, is the establishment of a
system of international courts, not only having compulsory juris-
diction of cases which may not be adjudicated by state courts, but
also empowered to review the decrees of municipal courts in cases
involving the Law of Nations and, possibly, the competence to judge
diversity of citizenship cases. It is rather apparent that this ideal
is possible of fulfillment only upon abandonment of the sovereignty
thereby for a world organized on a federal basis.
132. Advisory opinion in the case of Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 174.
133. Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the Charter.
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